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TITLE INSURANCE: STATE REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC
PERSPECTIVE *
E. F. ROBERTSt
The nature of regulation now in force at the state level and applicable to title insurance companies is such that the industry is not
adequately regulated. Such a conclusion can mean two different things.
On the one hand, it can mean this particular segment of the insurance
industry is not immune from federal regulation under the provisions of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' On the other hand, it can mean that
the public is not being adequately protected by the insurance laws of the
several states when it purchases title insurance. Suffice to say, this
conclusion includes both meanings within its scope.
It is the purpose of this article to illustrate only one aspect of the
problem, namely, the protection of the public as purchasers of title
insurance. In order to illustrate why the current insurance codes are
inadequate, however, it will be necessary to examine the nature of the
title insurance industry itself. Further, it will become evident that
before the changes in regulation which are necessary to protect the
public can be initiated, certain other questions must be answered. Briefly, assuming reform is needed, where does the Bar fit into the picture,
since it has a stake in the problem; and where do the new lawyers' guarantee funds fit in any new regulatory structure? It should also become
clear that the real problems involved in regulating the title insurance
industry cannot be solved simply by manipulating clauses in an insurance
* The thoughts contained in this article were put together while the author was a
visiting professor at the University of Nottingham. Looking back at the American
scene from the vantage point of a jurisdiction in which an efficient system of land
registration is in vogue one may wonder whether an English conveyancer didn't hit the
nail on the head when he observed: "It appears to me that you people are about two
hundred years behind the times." Be that as it may one must deal with the situation as
it is and proposed reforms must fall within at least the penumbra of the attainable; it is
assumed, therefore, that some form of title insurance is here to stay, at least for the

foreseeable future.
tProfessor of Law, Villanova School of Law.
1. 59 Stat. 33 (1945) ; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1945).
42 & 45 infra.

See text accompanying notes
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code. This is so not merely because the title insurance device is inextricably interrelated with the conveyancing processes by which real
estate is transferred from one owner to another, but because that device
serves as a vital cog underpinning the national mortgage market. The
effects of tinkering with the insurance laws must be viewed, therefore,
in light of the possible effect on the whole financial structure revolving
around investments in real property.
THE NATURE OF TITLE INSURANCE

Title insurance does not insure the policyholder against the risk
that sometime in the future a defect may arise which will detract from
the insured's title to real property. Instead title insurance is designed
to protect the insured against the day when it is discovered that a defect
already existed in the title to real property at the time it was insured.
Assuming, therefore, that a particular title to real estate is perfect when
it is insured, it follows that the title insurance company undertakes no
risk at all loss wise when it insures this piece of real estate. 2 It must
also be borne in mind that the company is liable to the insured only for
actual losses suffered by him as the result of a subsequently discovered
defect in his title: the undertaking of the company is perforce one of
indemnity. Further, the company's liability for losses is limited to the
face amount of the policy.'
Counterpoint to these limitations upon the insurer's liability are
two factors which must be interpolated into the title insurance equation
2. "The risks of title insurance end where the risks of other kinds begin. Title
insurance, instead of protecting the insured against matters that may arise during a
stated period after the issuance of the policy, is designed to save him harmless from
any loss through defects, liens or encumbrances that may affect or burden his title when
he takes it." Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 176 N.Y. 65, 72, 68
N.E. 132, 134 (1903). Accord, Froehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co.,
217 Pa. 331, 66 AtI. 561 (1907). For definitions of title insurance see 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 32 (5th ed. 1952) ; Pelkey, The Law of Title Insurance, 12 MARQ. L. REv. 38,
42-43 (1927).
3.

In rare instances it is possible to sue the insurer for negligence, quite apart from

the policy of insurance, and thereby avoid this limitation on liability. This happens most
often in cases where the company runs the search and examination of the title as a service distinct from the issuance of the insurance policy. E.g., Henkels v. Philadelphia
Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super. 110, 110 A.2d 878 (1955). In order to avoid this contingency most insurers now impose a single charge for all the services rendered, and
the new American Title Association policy forms contain a clause limiting the rights of
the insured to the policy. "Any action or actions or rights of action that the Insured
may have or may bring against the Company arising out of the status of the title insured herein must be based on the provisions of this policy."

PUBLIC REGULATION OF

328 (Roberts ed. 1961). But see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm. L.
REV. 629 (1943). For a fine survey of the cases and the problems involved in this area
see Note, Title Insurance: The Duty to Search, 71 YALE L.J. 1161 (1962).
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ABSTRACTERS

TITLE INSURANCE
before one can arrive at a value judgment about the efficacy of such
insurance. First, the company undertakes to defend the title as insured
against adverse claims and, as a rule, the companies have proved to be
tenacious litigants.4 Even if the company is successful in defending the
title, that is, even if the title does prove to be perfect, the company must
bear the costs of the legal quarrel. Thus even a no-loss-risk title involves a potential risk of claim expenses.5 Second, there is no precise
term cutting short the time during which the company continues to be
liable to indemnify and/or defend the insured. The statute of limitations on claims for indemnity by the insured does not begin to run until
he has actually suffered a loss attributable to a defect in the title.6
At best, therefore, the company can hope that the operation of the
doctrine of adverse possession will protect the insured against most
losses after the expiration of the typical twenty year period.7
The losses against which the insured is protected by title insurance
fall into two classes. First, just as with the lawyer-conveyancer, the
search may have been inadequate or the examination of the abstract may
have been faulty. Surprisingly, most claims against title insurance
companies arise because of these errors.' Whereas the lawyer-conveyancer would be liable in tort for losses resultant from such oversights
or errors only if he had been "negligent," the title insurance company
is liable on elementary contract principles. Second, quite unlike the
lawyer-conveyancer, the title insurance company is liable to indemnify the insured for losses arising out of defects not a matter of record,
or if of record, of such a nature that they could not reasonably be
expected to have been discovered by a thorough, search of the local
4. Davenport, Title Insurance, in 1 EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE CO MPANIES 30910 (N.Y. Ins. Dept. 1954); Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 499-500

(1957).

5. "In the case of a small policy, the expense of defending the title is sometimes
greater than the amount of the policy." Davenport, op. cit. supra note 4, at 310.
6. Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 Pac. 667 (1923);
Purcell v. Land Title Guar. Co., 94 Mo. App. 5, 67 S.W. 726 (1920).
7. The experience of my company-and we have an accumulated policy liability of 79 years-is that over eighty percent of our losses arise within five
years of the policy date and 90% within ten years but that we occasionally have
losses which arise more than 25 years after the assumption of the risk. Only
this year we paid a sizeable loss on a policy which was written before World
War I-over 50 years ago. The property had not changed hands in the interim
and adverse possession did not help us much as to marketability because there
was absolutely no color of title to a portion of the land.

Deatly, One Man Looks at Public Regulation, Title News, March 1963, p. 5, 9.

S. "More losses result from the negligence of company employees and agents than
from any other cause; negligent failure to note unpaid taxes, restrictive covenants, easements and judgments have proved particularly troublesome." Johnstone, supra note 4,
at 502. See Burlingame, Experience in Losses and Claims, Eastern Area, Title News,

Dec. 1953, p. 66.
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record depositories. These are the "hidden defects" not protected
against by conventional conveyancing techniques, including such things
as forgeries, unknown heirs, and marriages not of local record.'
Another thing that must be considered is the fact that a title insurance company will except from coverage any obvious defects which
it discovers in the title. This is the root of the often heard charge that
"title insurance insures against nothing." True enough if title insurance
was casualty insurance, but it is not: the whole point of title insurance
is to afford protection against only the errors and omissions of the
traditional conveyancing process and against hidden defects which escape
discovery by even the best searches. It supplements the traditional
search and examination of record title; it does not do away with the
system."0
How does title insurance add to or subtract from the conventional
protection afforded the vendee of real estate? If the vendee does suffer
a loss, he can be certain of being indemnified without proving negligence.11 At the same time, unlike a claim for negligence, the amount
of the recovery is limited by the face amount of the policy. The insured
must be careful, therefore, to acquire more insurance if he makes improvements or simply to make allowances for inflation. Curiously
enough, not even the companies themselves advertise this fact. The
vendee, moreover, is protected against losses attributable to hidden defects, a total departure from traditional techniques. While rather disastrous if and when they do occur, it must be admitted that such claims
are rather rare." Most significant, perhaps, is the fact that the company
undertakes to defend the title as insured: in effect, if nothing else, the
vendee has retained a powerful champion against the day a potential
adverse claimant appears.
9. For an extensive list of bidden defects see PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE INSUl7 n.6 (Roberts ed. 1961). Some of these defects are
automatically excluded from coverage by the general clauses found in nearly all contracts.
10. "It cannot be said dogmatically, then, that title insurance is not true insurance;
rather it should be said that title insurance represents a series of services, the reliability
of which is guaranteed by the performer." GAGE, LAND TITLE ASSURING AGENCIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 130 (1937).
11. See also note 3 supra.
12. The protection afforded by the lawyers' opinion system is almost as great
as that provided by title insurance, if competent lawyers and abstracters are
used. The added protection of title insurance covers only remote risks, although the losses can be heavy if they do occur. Abstracters and lawyers are
liable in tort for their negligence, but it is difficult to secure a judgment against
a lawyer for negligence in examination. . . . But even though they keep lower
ANCE COMPANIES AND ABSTRAcTERs

reserves than other insurance companies, title insurance companies are better
able financially to pay losses than are abstracters and lawyers, and they are
more likely to be in existence when the losses occur.
Johnstone, supra note 4, at 498.

TITLE INSURANCE
Given the prevailing insurance premium of $3.50 per thousand
dollars coverage, the costs of protection can be rationalized by spreading
them out over the typical twenty year period during which adverse
protection arguments are most generally unavailable to the vendee."
Taking this approach the protection afforded by title insurance costs
seventeen cents per thousand per year during this particularly vulnerable
period. Even though the protection afforded by title insurance is only
minimally higher than that afforded by traditional techniques, the extra
charge is itself commensurate with the added increment of protection.
Title insurance is probably worth the money, but only marginally so as
far as the vendee is concerned.1 4 This rather lukewarm conclusion
instantly raises the real problem: how is it then that the title insurance
industry has become the multimillion dollar enterprise that it is today?
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE INSURANCE

In the air-conditioned executive suites of the largest title insurance
company in Philadelphia one may still hear recited, Beowulf-wise, the
conventional genesis of title insurance. According to this tale many
lay conveyancers were operating in Philadelphia after the Civil War,
these laymen carrying on a tradition that arose during colonial days
when a shortage of lawyers caused literate members of the community
to assume the conveyancer's function.15 Be that as it may, in the year
13. The premium for title insurance is paid once-when the policies are issued. In
practice the vendee pays the premium for both his own policy and the mortgagee's
policy. If the insurance is obtained through an approved attorney, this premium is the
only charge made by the insurer. In those cases where the insurer handles the conveyancing as well, a single charge is imposed which includes the premium as only a
part of the total charge.

Each time a house is sold, of course, the new vendee must obtain his own title insurance policies for himself and his mortgagee. In the case where the insurer is also the
conveyancer, the frequent turnover of the ownership of property increases the insurer's
profits on conveyancing. This is so because the insurer has on file the results of its
original search and examination of the title and now it needs only to bring these up to
date, charging the same rate for the packaged insurance and conveyancing services.
Should the mortgage be assigned, however, the original lender's policy covers subsequent
assignees. This accords with the idea that title insurance expedites the negotiability of
mortgage portfolios and, concomitantly, with the suggestion that the interests of the
owner-class are not necessarily represented by the lenders in negotiations vis-i-vis title
insurance protection. Compare American Title Association Standard Loan Policy-Revised Coverage-1960, which provides that the "insured" includes "each successor in
interest" in the ownership of the mortgage indebtedness, with American Title Association
Owner's Policy-Standard Form A-1960, which limits coverage to the "Insured, the
heirs, devisees and personal representatives of such Insured," omitting subsequent purchasers from the insured. PUBLIc REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND
ABSTRACTERS apps. A, B (Roberts ed. 1961).
14. Ibid.
15. E.g., LaBrum v. Commonwealth, 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948). "From the
earliest days in this Commonwealth, justices of the peace, aldermen and local magistrates have drawn and still continue to draw leases, deeds and mortgages without hold-

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

1867 one Watson, a vendee, brought an action of negligence against
Muirhead, a lay conveyancer. Watson had recently purchased an interest in real estate, and Muirhead had searched the title for him and
had approved it. The title was not free and clear, however, and the
execution of a judgment of record shortly wiped out Watson's purchase.
Muirhead had been aware of the judgment but he had relied in turn on
the opinion of "Eminent Counsel" that it was not a final one. To make
a long story short, the highest court of Pennsylvania ultimately ruled
that Muirhead owed Watson the duty of reasonable care, thereby
equating lay conveyancers and lawyers, and, further, that Muirhead had
proceeded reasonably, relying as he did on counsel's advice."
Convention has it that this decision shocked the conscience of both
bench and bar in Philadelphia, revealing as it did a glaring defect in the
conveyancing system. That is, absent recourse against the vendor on
warranties, the vendee was forced to suffer the entire loss should an
adverse claimant appear upon the scene after the vendee's conveyancer
had, in the exercise of due care, advised vendee that the title was free
and clear. Shocking as this may be, it is somewhat difficult to imagine
why it should have upset the bench and bar in the nineteenth century
when, after all, this result was axiomatic in any common law jurisdiction.
More pertinent may have been the fact that Philadelphia was preparing for its Centennial Exposition of 1876 and that a land boom was
anticipated. Relevant also was the fact that the public record system
pertaining to land in Philadelphia was in an appalling state.' As chance
would have it Watson v. Muirhead8 warned potential land buyers off
lay conveyancers just at this moment. In this situation an early critic
of title insurance speculated that:
The effect of this selective process was to centralize the
bulk of the conveyancing business into fewer and stronger
hands. The added volume of orders, concentrated in a few
ing themselves out as lawyers or engaging in the practice of law in the sense condemned
by statute." Id. at 244, 56 A.2d at 248.

16. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
17. It was necessary to search records in ten different offices, and in instances,
the searching was done by public officials in these offices rather than by the
conveyancer himself.

The responsibility of the public officials by statute did

not extend beyond five years from their term of office. Thus the abstract
based upon name indexes from ten different offices, compiled by a variety of
searchers including the conveyancer, was a rather risky document to rely upon
for title protection in light of the Watson v. Mitirhead decision.
GAGE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 81 n. 10.
18. 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
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law firms, created a precarious situation. The conveyancers
had no way of speeding up the assuring process without shortening the searching operation and taking upon themselves incalculable risks. This condition, and perhaps the astuteness
of the "Philadelphia lawyers," led a group of progressive conveyancers to band together, pool their resources, and establish
in 1876 the Real Estate Title Insurance Company. 9
Thus was the title industry the product of improvization in the
face of crisis. Granted that Gage's speculations quoted above are more
in accord with reality than the conventional myth, it remains to be seen
why a device developed to solve a Philadelphia problem should have
been adopted elsewhere.
Before the First World War title insurance had spread to other
cities like New York, Washington and Chicago. Convention again has
an explanation, this one turning on the point that the "hidden defect"
protection afforded by title insurance made it preferable to older techniques. Once again the most likely explanation is to be founded on
other reasons. The public record depositories in many large cities were
completely out of date. Decades old in both facilities and techniques,
these record centers were becoming a stumbling block to efficient con,veyancing. In the urban centers, given the time needed to search titles,
conveyancing was ceasing to pay its way in large law firms. Conconiitantly, given the fact that conveyancing had become a profitless
chore, the industrial development was creating new types of business for lawyers. As a result conveyancing simply atrophied in the
urban firms. Title insurance companies, needless to say, were more
than willing to take over conveyancing and create their own efficient
record systems-their "title plants"-in lieu of the delapidated public
ones.
This situation, however, was only a condition. Had there been no
title companies, other expedients, such as reform of the public record
centers, would have had to have been found. As it was title insurance
tied in with lending money and it has been suggested that: "A powerful
factor in the growth of the New York companies was their early combining with the evidencing of titles the lending of money on mortgage;
the two businesses so supplemented each other as to give dominating positions in both fields.""19.

GAGE,

op. cit. supra note 10, at 81.

20. Viele, The Problem of Land Titles, 44 FoL. Sci. Q. 421, 430-31 (1929). This
article affords another excellent description of the chaotic conditions present in the publicrecord systems.
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Thus, title insurance from the start was part and parcel of the
financing aspect of real estate transactions. In Pennsylvania title insurance again was part and parcel of the banking industry, almost every
bank having its own title department. Whereas in New York City the
title insurance phase of banking may simply have been a lucrative sideline, in Pennsylvania title insurance was a device used to get around
restrictive banking laws which limited the number of banks in any given
area. This was done by opening a title company, which had the ancillary power to lend money and accept deposits, the "Title and Trust
Company" shortly becoming a standard feature of the Pennsylvania
21

scene.

Title insurance was still relatively unimportant, however, until the
boom following the First World War. It was then that the demand for
money outstripped the local supply and that the institutional investors,
particularly the growing life insurance companies, entered the picture.
Able and eager to invest in real estate mortgages these institutional
investors faced a serious problem: how were they to know how good
the title to their security was? Dealing on a national scale, with a
tremendous volume, either these investors had to know the reliability
of thousands of local conveyancers or had to run their own searches.
Either alternative being impracticable, these institutional investors began
to demand title insurance as a condition precedent to their lending money
on the security of real property."
This development marked a new era in conveyancing techniques in
the United States. When the mortgage market became a nationwide
affair, title insurance became the imprimatur which made a mortgage
negotiable in this new market. It did so because the lender did not
have to worry about thousands of local lawyers: it had only to keep
track of a relatively few other insurance companies. Better yet, these
companies were liable to make good any loss of the security regardless
of negligence, and, unlike iawyers, they were corporate entities, which
seemed to be assurance that they would neither die nor become insolvent.
Best of all, since the buyer paid for the title insurance, protecting the
respective interests of both the buyer and the lender, the service cost
the institutional investors nothing.
Thus it was that a consumer was found for title insurance and the
21. GAGE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 117 n. 4.
22. Ford, How California Went Title Insurance Over Night, in Proceedings, American Title Association (1932) ; Payne, In Search of Title, 14 ALA. L. REi. 11, 37 n. 82.
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industry began to prosper.23 In urban centers the title companies began
to take over conveyancing and the whole conveyancing process was
centered in the companies' offices. Their records of past searches being
kept on file and efficiently indexed, the title companies had to use the
public records only in order to keep their data up to date. The burden
on the public records was thereby lightened considerably, and, in lieu of
modernizing the public records, privately owned modem plants were
created. Able to institute electronic data processing and to apply assembly line principles to the search and examination aspects of the real
estate transaction, title insurance companies were able to make conveyancing pay. Given the other avenues of business opened up by the
boom period the lawyers hardly noticed the loss of the conveyancing
trade. Further, the problem of losses attributable to errors in the conveyancing process had been socialized, the costs of these losses being
spread by the insurance device across the property-purchasing public, to
the intense relief of the investors in mortgage loans. 4
Thus far the title insurance story has been an urban one. With
the advent of the national mortgage market, however, title insurance
became a national institution itself. Conveyancers outside the megalopolis on each coast were used to put title insurance into every state.
This was done when certain conveyancers, who met the companies'
standards, were authorized to commit the companies to insure titles
after these lawyers had completed their routine conveyancing work.
Thus, in this instance, title insurance was used specifically to supplement the traditional conveyancing process, the companies dealing only
in insurance and the lawyers handling the entire conveyancing routine
in the standard manner. This allowed the urban conveyancing and
insurance companies to reap additional "pure" insurance income from
suburban and rural areas, and, at the same time, gave certain "approved
attorneys" an edge over their competitors. This edge consisted of the
fact that their imprimatur provided access to the institutional investors
for mortgage money.25
23. The size of this particular consumer is staggering. These institutional investors hold eighty per cent of the national non-farm real estate mortgage debt. For a
ready set of figures, only now growing obsolete, see Johnstone, supra note 4, at 502 n. 39.
24. The use of title insurance by large lenders is somewhat curious because
title losses are quite small and self-insurance might be considerably cheaper.
I rather suspect that the real reason is that the institutional (and other)
lender is not particularly concerned with a cost which is paid for entirely by
the mortgagor and which admittedly gives the mortgagee some additional protection.
Payne, supra note 22, at 37 n. 82.
25. The Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, for example, operates on this principle for the most part. In theory this kind of title insurance company makes no in-
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ROAD TO CHAOS

As part and parcel of the greed enthroned during the twenties a
new idea was born: mortgage insurance. That is, companies were.
formed which, for a premium, ,insured the lender against the risk that
the mortgagor would default on his installments or, worse, on the principal itself. A feasible idea granting a permanent inflation, the idea
was a patent absurdity given a crash. Nonetheless a number of new
"title insurance companies" were formed in many states, particularly
New York, again because title insurance companies possessed the power
to insure mortgages. The result was disastrous. In New York, for
example, of the forty new title insurance companies founded during this
period, thirty-one had to be taken over for rehabilitation after the crash
and all of these companies were eventually liquidated. 3
It was during the Great Depression that, naturally enough, the
several state legislatures began to enact statutes regulating the title insurers. New York, perhaps because it was hardest hit by the mortgage
insurance disaster, took the lead in this reform. This reform legislation
had a pattern, however, which was common to a number of states.
First, jurisdiction over title insurers was vested in the insurance department and certain financial safeguards were set up. Indeed, it shortly
became impracticable for banks to continue operating their title departments as integral units of the banks themselves; so these departments
were set up as title insurance companies per se, the stock, of course,
being retained by their parent banks. Title insurance and banking were
separated operationally, albeit not ownershipwise.2" Second, title insurance companies incorporated after the new legislation were forbiddependent examination of titles; it simply relies on the reports of the examining attorney. Even a staunch opponent of title insurance companies admits that "if this were the
only kind of title insurance it would have little significance except insofar as some additional safety at considerable additional expense is obtained." Payne, supra note 22, at
37. But see text accompanying note 46 infra.
26. Gray, Title Insurance Companies, in 4 EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES

227, 248-49 (N.Y. Ins. Dept. 1954).
27. The real control of title insurance companies remains a mystery. Since many
title companies were created by incorporating trust company title departments, it has
been assumed that the trust companies have maintained control over the stock of these
companies. But the growth of the industry has required further stock sales in order to
broaden the capital base in light of the enormous volume of liabilities assumed in recent
years. Thus stock in many title insurance companies is now commonly sold "over the
counter." This trend would indicate that the companies may be in the process of becoming independent entities, or it may mean that they have become so large that the
banks can maintain control with less than a majority of the shares. The increased activity in the purchase and sale of title insurance company stock seems confirmed recently
by a new investment guide specifically addressed to a study of the industry as an investment opportunity. See an advertisement on this point in Title News, July 1963, p. 27.
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den -8 to write other lines of insurance, particularly mortgage guaranty
insurance. Third, having created a set of title insurance companies,
now sui generis, the states applied economic controls which were designed to insure the continued solvency of these companies.
Looking across the vast statutory maze of fifty insurance codes it
is possible to see a broad pattern to the financial controls imposed on
the industry. Constructing a typical code representing a fair image of
this legislation is probably the most expedient way of approaching the
problem since no two codes are exactly alike.29 Such a code would
center on the requirement that the company have a minimum paid-in
capital of $250,000 and a paid-in surplus of $125,000. In theory,
therefore, the company has assets available out of which policyholders
may expect to exact payment in the event of claims arising against the
company. In addition to these assets the company must, under the
typical code, create a reserve of a percentage of premium income. This
fund must be set aside to protect against the day that claims might wipe
out all the other assets of the company, at which time it could be used
to purchase reinsurance for the policyholders who did not as yet have
claims.
On the surface the regulations appear to be adequate since the loss
experience of the companies is such that no one in the regulatory agencies seems to have taken seriously the idea that a hidden defect"0 might
occur leading to a total loss. 1 In fact, experience to date indicates that
the actual losses incurred by title insurers involve petty matters overlooked by their own searches. These overlooked charges on the land
are simply paid off by the insurer as a matter of course. So insignificant are these claims in fact that the actual loss experience nationwide
was recently calculated to be 1.69 per cent of premium income!2 Presuming the accuracy of this calculation and discounting the idea that
28. N.Y. INs. LAws §§ 40, 46 (18) ; accord, PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 40, § 899 (1954).
Most insurance codes do not contain this clause, although they achieve the same result
by simply limiting title companies to single-line underwriting. (A few states still expressly authorize a title insurance company to write mortgage guaranty insurance.)
29. Citations to all states are available in PUBLic REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANIES AND ABSTRAcTERS ch. 6 (Roberts ed. 1961).

30. Of course, a total loss could occur either (1) because the search may have
been inadequate or the examination of the abstract may have been faulty, or (2) because
a hidden defect was discovered subsequently. Since the first source of total loss is relatively unimportant when compared with the second, the remainder of the paper will
refer only to the latter category. With the number of insurance policies increasing at
an ever-expanding rate and with assets failing to increase concomitantly, it is the source
of total loss which presents the significant danger.
31. A total loss is a loss equal to the face amount of the insured's policy.
32. Johnstone, supra note 4, at 501 & n. 34. See also GAGE, op. Cit. supra note 10,
at 111-14, stating the figure is "not far from . . . 1.5%."
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hidden defects ever occur in practice, there is no need for any financial
requirement for a sizeable capital or surplus since a title insurer can
easily pay all claims out of premium income.
The extent to which an insurance code puts serious emphasis on the
probability of a hidden defect leading to a total loss can be measured
quite easily by running through the code to find out whether it imposes
a maximum single risk on the insurer. Pennsylvania, for example, after
setting up capital, surplus and reserve requirements added a maximum
single risk provision of this order: no policy could be issued for a single
transaction under which liability would exceed an amount ten times
the company's capital and surplus.3" In practice, therefore, this meant
that a company with a capital and surplus totalling $375,000 could
lawfully insure the title to a single block of real estate worth $3,750,000.
If a hidden defect should occur, however, even the insured above would
not be "insured" for more than one tenth the value of the property,
while his single claim would wipe out all of the assets of the company,
rendering the policies of all of the other insureds absolutely worthless.34
More interesting still, most states set no maximum at all on the single
risk an insurer may assume.35
The state regulation imposed during the Depression, which for the
most part represents the regulation still in effect, assumes that title
insurance is not insurance in the sense that the hidden risks "insured"
against are totally discounted. The statutes assume that the title insurers deal only in conventional risks common to lawyer-conveyancers
and that any losses which ensue will be for overlooked liens on the
periphery of the fee itself. Even though the states do not take seriously
the possibility of a total loss, the institutional investors that rely on
title insurance do. The institutional investors regularly impose their
own maximum single risk requirement on the title insurers, requiring
the company writing the policy to reinsure the risk over a certain amount
33. Pa. Laws 1921, act 682, § 905.
34. Assuming a claim is filed it would seem that the claimant, having sustained
an actual loss, would have a priority to the reserves of the company vis-a-vis the mass
of policyholders who as yet have no claims whatsoever. This remains an assumption
since the liquidation provisions of insurance laws applicable to title insurance companies
normally do not provide an answer. See generally STATE REGULATION OF TITLE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ABSTRACTERS § 8.20 (Roberts ed. 1961).
35. Id. § 3.60. Kansas, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota and South Carolina
place a ten per cent of capital and surplus ceiling on risks unless reinsurance is obtained.
In Indiana a company is subject to a similar ceiling if it is organized as a casualty
company writing title insurance but is not subject to the limitation if it is organized as
a title insurance company per se. Mississippi, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin limit
single risks to fifty per cent of capital and surplus and North Carolina to forty per cent.
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with other title insurance companies.
cluded that:

Thus Professor Johnstone con-

The practice of reinsurance is nevertheless well developed
in the industry, some companies reinsuring all risks over
$25,000. This practice is encouraged by the refusal of na,tional lenders to accept policies of small companies that do not
reinsure a safe percentage of each large policy they write. 6
In effect, therefore, the strongest source of regulation over the
title insurance industry is a system of unofficial regulation imposed by
the primary consumers of the title insurance product.
The fact that private regulation by the real consumers of title insurance was, and is, the only real regulation presents a difficult
situation, for the public, particularly the home owner class, is not a
party to it. Title insurance is issued in two policies, one for the home
owner and one for the lender, each policy protecting the respective
interests of each. While paid for by the purchaser, it has been generally true that the lender's policy has been more favorable to him than
the owner's policy to the home owner. For example, should the lender
be required to take the home owner's rights in the property upon default, it is insured against the possibility that the title might be declared
unmarketable. Until quite recently the purchaser was not similarly protected as to marketability. It is, of course, arguable that the risk is
much less in the case of a lender because, obviously, there is little chance
that he will ever take possession of the property. Nonetheless the difference in treatment has continued to be a sorepoint"
Worse, even
though the institutional investors were using their leverage as consumers
to gain advantages for themselves, the fact remains that they were not
interested in regulating rates, since, after all, it was commonly the purchaser who paid for the title insurance.8"
36. Johnstone, supra note 4, at 502.

37. E.g., id. at 504.

3S. For the most part there is no rate regulation worthy of the name other than
the requirement that the insurers file their current rates with the insurance commissioner.
New York, Pennsylvania and Texas are the only states which make a concerted effort
to fix rates on the basis of specific statutory criteria. PUBLIC REGULATION OF TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANIES AND ABSTRACTERS ch. 7 (Roberts ed. 1961).
But see the new
Pennsylvania statute, Pa. Laws 1963, act 439, § 739, which reads:
(a) In making rates, due consideration shall be given to past and prospective
loss experience, to exposure to loss[,] to underwriting practice and judgment, to
the extent appropriate to past and prospective expenses, including commissions
paid to agents and applicants for title insurance, the expenses incurred by title
insurance companies, to a reasonable margin of profit and contingencies, and
to all other relevant factors both within and outside this Commonwealth.
(b) Rates shall not be inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, nor shall rates
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Because of the continued use of title insurance by the institutional
investors during the depression, the industry survived 1929. Then,
with the Second World War and the ensuing boom, the title insurance
industry appeared to prosper. Indeed, some of the figures quoted illustrate an almost fantastic growth.
The title insurance industry, having grown gradually since its
beginnings in the nineteenth century, has increased markedly in
national importance since the Second World War. The
amount of title insurance written increased from $858,600,000
in 1944 to $2,684,400,000 in 1952. There are over one
hundred forty companies in the United States engaged in
writing title insurance, over thirty of which write title insurance in more than one State. Premiums written in 1960
amounted to over $130,000,000." 9
Not only was volume up, but profits seemed to have soared. Thus it
was reported in Barronms, in 1961, that the pre-tax profits of California
companies were twenty per cent in a "poor year" and "as high as thirty
percent in a good year."4 But the picture was not all sweetness and
light because the post-war boom did generate reactions unfavorable to
the industry from several quarters. Coming as they did from several
directions and for various reasons, these forces-antithetical as they
were to title insurance-must be considered.
At the very end of the war, the Supreme Court decided that insurance was interstate commerce, a decision which seemed to spell an end
be excessive; that is, such as to permit title insurance companies to earn a

greater profit, after payment of all taxes upon all income, than is necessary

to enable them to earn over the years sufficient amounts to pay their actual
expenses and losses arising in the conduct of their title insurance business, including commissions paid and the actual costs of maintaining a title plant, plus
a reasonable profit. (c) In ascertaining the estimated future earnings of title
companies, the commissioner shall utilize a properly weighted cross section of
title insurance companies operating in this Commonwealth representative of the
average of normally efficiently operated title insurance companies including
on a weighted basis, both title insurance companies having their own title plants,
and those not operating upon the title plant system. In ascertaining what is a
reasonable profit after payment of all taxes on such income, the commissioner
shall give due consideration to the following matters: (1) The average rates of
profit after payment of taxes on all income earned by other industry generally;
(2) The desirability for stability of rate structure; (3) The necessity of insuring through growth in assets in times of high business activity, the financial
solvency of title insurance companies in times of economic depression; and
(4) The necessity of earning sufficient dividends on the stock of title insurance
companies to induce capital to be invested in title insurance companies. ...
39. Complaint, para. 8, United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., and Complaint,
para. 8, United States v. Kansas City Title Ins. Co., Civil No. 14130-3, W.D. Mo., Nov.
9, 1962. Compare Johnstone, supra note 4, at 492-93.
40. Willatt, Title Insurance, in BaoN's (Sept. 18, 1961).
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to all state regulation." Congress, busy as it was with other concerns,
sidestepped the problem of legislating a national insurance code by enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the thrust of which was to delegate
back to the several states the burden of regulating the insurance industry. 2 Insurance companies were thereby exempted from the Sherman,
Clayton, Federal Trade Commission and Robinson-Patman Acts up to
a point. Unfortunately the industry, generally, failed to notice the
qualification: the federal laws were still applicable to any insurance
company "to the extent that such business is not regulated by the State
law." 43
Given the boom period it seemed that the title insurance industry
was not exempt from Mr. Justice Holmes' observation that "competition means combination, and that the organization of the world, now
going on so fast, means an ever-increasing might and scope of combination." 4 Chicago Title and Trust Company, for example, started the
process in 1954 that today has made it the second largest title insurance
company in the country. Having operated primarily in Cook County,
the company began by acquiring ownership of abstract companies and
smaller title companies in Illinois, until Chicago Title in 1960 was
writing over 95 per cent of the title insurance in the state. This was
followed in 1957 by the purchase of a substantial stock interest in Lake
County Title Company, Indiana, which, ultimately, was dissolved, its
assets being transferred to Lake County Title Co., Inc. Similar acquisitions followed in Missouri and Wisconsin, culminating in acquisition of
the control of the huge Home Title Guaranty Company of New York.
The crisis was reached when Chicago Title acquired substantially all the
stock in Kansas City Title. The Justice Department reacted at this
point and filed an antitrust action against Chicago Title alleging that
its most recent acquisition constituted a violation of section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
The action is still pending. Its implications, however,
41. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). It
is reported that "the entire insurance industry and the state regulatory agencies received
a catastrophic shock precipitating an avalanche of fear and uncertainty when the . . .
Court handed down [its] epochal decision." 1 RIcHAns, INSURANCE 169 (5th ed. 1952).
42. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952).
43. FTC v. Travellers Health Ass'n, 298 F.2d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 1962), is an illustration that federal jurisdiction still exists where state regulation is not "effective."
For a reappraisal of the impact of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in the light of this
case, see Wiley, Pups, Plants and Package Policies-or the Insurance Anti-Trust EXemiption Re-examnihed, 6 VILL. L. REv. 281 (1961).
44. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
45. United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., and United States v. Kansas City
Title Ins. Co., Civil 14130-3, W.D. Mo., Nov. 9, 1962; "In 1960, the Senate Antitrust
Subcommittee issued a report declaring that states have failed to deal effectively with
the mounting mergers in this industry. Of 187 mergers in this industry from 1953 to
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can, hardly have escaped the industry.
Title insurance companies had become national, of course, by acquiring approved attorneys or abstract companies to act as agents to
issue title insurance. From these agencies, the title insurers received
only premium income. But Professor Johnstone of Yale in a perceptive article raised the question whether premium income alone was
enough. That is, he suggested that the dynamics of the title insurance
industry were such that the companies must convert these agencies into
title plants.4"
Operations-wise, there are two basic kinds of title plant. The
most complex and expensive system involves the creation of a facsimile
of the public records on the company premises. This is done simply by
having the company's trained personnel copy off the daily entries on the
public ledgers and insert the information into the company ledgers. The
company's facsimile registry has two distinct advantages over the public's original one. First, all of the entries in the private system are
collected under one roof whereas the public system includes entries in
several different places, such as the registry of deeds, the registry of
wills, various tax offices and several court houses. Second, whereas
the public records may be indexed rather haphazardly, the company's
facsimile registry is indexed in several different ways with the utmost
precision," and it may be keyed into a system of electronic data pro1957, not one was disapproved by state insurance regulators, the subcommittee noticed."
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 2.
46. Johnstone, supra note 4, at 515. Johnstone actually said: "Heavy title insurance saturation in small towns apparently will require all-inslusive service by an agent or
branch office of the insurer, using a title plant." Id. Payne agrees, noting that "there
is a tendency for the following sequence of events to occur: An abstracting plant is set
up; it later begins to act as an agent in the writing of insurance; when sufficient volume
of transactions can be relied upon, the abstract company is converted into a title company." Payne, supra note 22, at 37 n. 81. But see Payne, Facilitating Title Practice:
Some Ways to Sotve Old Problems, 15 ALA. L. Rav. 18, 23-24 (1962).
There are two possible reasons why this trend should exist. First, the real profit in
title insurance may be derived from the conveyancing work the companies do and not
from the insurance that is sold. Certainly in New York City the income derived from
"service charges" far outweighs premium income. For example, for the year 1961, the
income of the Title Guarantee Company was $2,181,300 on premiums and $6,555,203 on
service charges. 2 N.Y. INs. REP. 1072-73 (1962). Second, the companies do fare better
loss-wise when they do their own work than when they simply insure a title for an approved attorney. Johnstone, supra note 4, at 501. (This fact might even be the basis
for an argument that title companies are better conveyancers than the lawyers.) Be
that as it may, this does indicate that companies with sound business sense might prefer
title plant operations to agency operations, not out of any mania to monopolize conveyancing but simply because the home-office approach works better.
47. For a detailed description of modern indexing techniques see Report, The Ideal
Title Plant, Title News, April 1963, p. 2; Collier, Let's Build a Title Plant, Title News,
January 1963, p. 60; Stamper, A Look at a Title and Abstract Plant, Title News, October 1958, p. 2.
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cessing.48 In short, this kind of title plant entails the reforms that
ought to have been made in the public sector years ago."
A less expensive method of title plant operation involves nothing
more than the filing of past searches and examinations of titles upon
which insurance has been issued. In the event a new owner applies for
title insurance on the same premises the existence of those files shortens
considerably the work involved, the file affording a place to start and
the job then being reduced to one of merely bringing the file up to
date."0
Putting two and two together, an astute lawyer could have imagined the day when the local abstract company, which also sold title insurance as an agent for a title insurance company, would be acquired
by one of the urban title companies and converted into a local title insurance company. Then, replete with a file of abstracts and insurance
policies, the new institution would need only to hire a few lawyers to
become a city-style conveyancing plant. Given the loss of the conveyancing business in the cities and the tendency of the title companies to
buy up abstract companies and convert them into title companies, the
lawyer's fear was a reasonable one. The result was a series of law
suits brought by various bar associations against title companies or
their outlets whenever any of them had begun to do conveyancing.5 1
Still other lawyers began to reason that the best way to fight fire
was with fire. Thus a group of lawyers in Florida organized a title
insurance device of their own, the Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund. The
Fund is a business trust established by fourteen hundred members of the
48. Chicago Title and Trust Company, for example, has installed electronic equipment capable of storing and retrieving information about all matters affecting the title
to more than 1,300,000 pieces of real estate in Cook County. Title News, July 1961, p.
38. Title Insurance and Trust Company of Los Angeles has a computer which can
carry on magnetic tape the tax data pertaining to 1,800,000 parcels and can regurgitate
this information at the rate of 900 printed lines a minute. The Age of Electronics,
Title News, May 1962, p. 12.
49. The ability of the title companies to put the records in order has not gone
unnoticed. E.g., Payne, FacilitatingTitle Practice: Some Ways to Solve Old Problems,

15 A.A. L. REv. 18, 33 n. 23 (1962):
Among those who have laid greatest stress upon the alleged "impossibility"

of creating any adequate system of public records have been the title insurance
representatives. Although they have insisted that nothing better than a system

devised shortly after the Revolution is suitable for our court houses, they have
insisted upon the most modem electronic equipment for their own establishments.

50. Ibid.
51. State Bar Ass'n v. Arizona Title & Trust, 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961); Beech
Abstract & Guar. Co. v. Bar Ass'n, 326 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1959); Title Guar. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 423, 312 P.2d 1011 (1957) ; Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co.
v. State Bar, 74 Nev. 186, 326 P.2d 408 (1958) ; New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern
N. J. Mtg. Ass'n, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v.
Grievance Comm., 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 (1944).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Florida Bar to conduct a title insurance business."2 Administered by a
board of fifteen member trustees, the Fund issues title insurance polides written by its members, who must be members of the Florida Bar.
An initial contribution of $200 by each member is provided for expenses
and the inception of a reserve for losses. Additional funds in the form
of premiums are, of course, received when the members write policies
for their clients. Receipts from each member are credited to his account
and expenses are allocated at the end of every year on the basis of contributions made. Losses on- policy claims are treated as ordinary expenses with the exception of losses occasioned by a member's negligence,
which are charged against the member's account. Credit balances standing in the Fund for more than seven years, the local period of adverse
possession, may be withdrawn by the members.
If all of this were not enough, rumors began to circulate the industry itself to the effect that some title insurance companies had ceased
searching and examining titles and were operating on a casualty basis.5"
If true this meant that if the scheme failed to work, these companies
were courting insolvency. In turn, assuming a series of company failures, the whole idea of title insurance would become suspect to its
52. Atkins, Lawyers' Title Guarantee Fund, 21 FLA. L.J. 215 (1947) ; Carter, .4
New Role for Lawyers: The Florida Lawyers' Title Guarantee Fund, 45 A.B.A.J. 803
(1959) ; Carter, Lawyers' Title Guarantee Fund, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 480 (1955). The
fund is not the same thing as a title insurance company incorporated on the lines of a
commercial insurance company, where the stock is owned by members of the bar. Presumably a commercial company, notwithstanding the identity of its owners, is subject to
the insurance laws of the state on a par with any other insurer. In Florida the statutes
require the business trust established by lawyers to meet the "other applicable requirements" of the code. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 609.04 (1956).
53. A title insurance company begins casualty underwriting when it omits the
actual search and examination stage from its program and simply prepares a deed and
issues title insurance to the vendee of real estate. The theory behind it is that out of
both the insurance premium and the rest of the package charge, now that overhead has
been all but eliminated, a sufficient reserve can be accumulated after profits with which
to pay losses as they arise. Since no one has tried it, or at least admitted publicly to
having tried it, there is no basis upon which to calculate whether the losses would or
would not exceed the income of the company. Such an experiment would change completely the conception of a title insurance company from its position now as a solvent
conveyancer into one as a possibly solvent issuer of deeds without searches and examinations of titles. As of the moment, at least, the consensus is that such a scheme would
not work, at least if the charges of the casualty company were going to be kept competitive with those of the conventional companies. See Johnstone, supra note 4, at 516.
It is interesting to note that Johnstone warned that this development should be "watched
with care." Ibid. See also Note, supra note 4, at 1165.
Some companies are engaged in a modified form of casualty underwriting. This
occurs when they discover a serious defect in the claim of title but do not except it from
policy coverage. This means that the exceptions in a title insurance policy do not
necessarily afford a true picture of the title's limitations. Based on hearsay evidence, it
appears that this practice is widespread. If it continues investors will not be able to rely
on the existence of title insurance as evidence of clear title and the very raison d'ctre
of the device will disappear.
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principal consumer-the institutional investor-who would begin investigating other methods of title assurance. That the idea would not work
is premised, of course, on the theory that the losses incurred by insuring
titles blindly would exceed income derived from charges fixed at rates
competitive with current title insurance costs. As of now it seems to
be agreed generally that the idea is unsound and will result in another
fiasco reminiscent of the New York mortgage guarantee companies."
At the moment, therefore, the title insurance industry finds itself
being enjoined by lawyers when it attempts to institute urban title company practices in new areas, and where it has succeeded in building itself up in urban areas it finds that success has served only to create
antitrust problems. Not only is it faced by law suits in areas where it
is still seeking to gain a foothold and in some where it has allegedly
acquired a stranglehold, it is now faced with a competitive device created by lawyers to counteract the whole idea of commercial title insurance,
while within the ranks of the industry itself the seeds of its own ruination may be germinating in the form of casualty underwriting. At the
same time there exists no coherent system of state regulation to assure
the continued financial reliability of the industry. Witness to all this,
moreover, is the public which pays for title insurance. The question
must perforce become: can the traditional systems of state regulation
provide enough answers to the travails of the title insurance industry in
order that the mass of policyholders can be assured that in fact they are
insured and, witness the growing problems in the industry, that they
will continue to be insured?
THE

REGULATION OF TITLE INSURERS RECONSIDERED

1. Preliminary Problems.
The difficulty with devising a coherent system of state regulation
of title insurance companies is rooted in the fact that the task is not
simply one of drafting rate schedules and extrapolating controls over
underwriting practices. Before any drafting is done the position of the
commercial title insurance company in the conveyancing sector must be
settled upon. First, one must deal with the problem of conveyancing
vis vis the state bars, deciding either to permit or to prohibit insurers'
conveyancing. Second, the problem of the lawyers' guaranty funds
must be squarely faced: are they to be regulated on a par with the
.

54. Tarpley, The Future of Title Insurawe, Title News, Oct. 1959. p. 24; Report
of the Chairman of Regional Districts, Title Insurance Executive-957-1958 Admuiustration, Title News, Jan. 1959, p. 102. See Johnstone, supra note 4, at 516; Payne, supra
note 22, at 61 n. 133.
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commercial insurers or are they to be, alternatively, immune from regulation or subject to their own special regulations?
The question of the lawyers' guarantee funds perhaps ought to
come first since, after all, most insurance codes begin with definitions.
In defining "title insurance" and "title insurers" the accepted definition
includes the funds within the group of things to be regulated by the
insurance laws. 55 To omit the lawyers' funds from regulation along
with the commercial insurers, therefore, will require either a new defiIf these funds are
nition of title insurance or an exemption clause."
unregulated, they might be tempted to set premiums at a hazardously
low level in order to gain control of the market for title insurance.
For after all, the purpose of the funds is to compete for the lion's share
From the point of view of the public
of the conveyancing dollar."
interest it is difficult to see why lawyers, who have a stake in the market
principle, should enter the business of insurance with any higher or
lower susceptibility to taking risks prejudicial to their insureds' interests
than any other segment of the community. Further, as profit is being
derived from the funds, it is difficult to see why the rates set by the
members of the funds are any less a matter of public concern. It would
seem to follow, therefore, that the fund must be included within the
ambit of any rational scheme of public regulation.
This conclusion necessitates rewriting certain basic concepts of
insurance regulation. This is so because most codes are based upon the
organization of the insurer as a business corporation with an initial
paid-in capital and surplus. In order to accommodate the funds, there55. E.g., Pa. Laws 1963, act 439, § 701(1) :
Title Insurance means insuring, guaranteeing or indemnifying against loss or
damage suffered by owners of real property or by others interested therein by
reasons of liens, encumbrances upon, defects in or the unmarketability of the
title to said real property; guaranteeing, warranting or otherwise insuring the
correctness of searches relating to the title to real property; and doing any
business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed
to evade the provisions of this article.
56. See note 52 supra.
57. The fund advocates have made no bones at all about the fund being an economic weapon. "It has been estimated that there is between one and one half and two
billion dollars a year in title work in the United States. Who should have the work
and receive the income-lawyers or corporations?" Carter, A New Role for Lawyers:
The Florida Lawyers' Guarantee Fund, 45 A.B.A.J. 803, 806 (1959). This war cry
seems part of the standard argument in favor of the funds. E.g., Rush, Title Assurance-A Bar Responsibility, S.D.B.J., July 1963, p. 38, 43. Indeed one of the arguments
against the fund is premised on the idea that it is somehow unseemly for lawyers to
enter the market place quite so openly. Spencer, Title Insurance, 1962 MASS. L. Q. 399.
(It should be noted that the author of this article is chairman of the board of a title
insurance company.) As to the problem of ethics involved in selling a client title insurance, whether commercial or fund type, see: A.B.A. STANDING Co
FESSIONAL ETHICS, FoamAL OPINIoN 304 (Feb. 1962).
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fore, provision would have to be made to permit the insurance commissioner to license a business trust to write title insurance if the initial
assets of the trust matched in size the assets of the regular insurers,
and in so far as reserves, rates and other provisions of the code were
concerned, if the trust continued to meet the requirements of the insurance laws for the protection of the public.
When it comes to defining the powers of commercial title insurers
the conveyancing question must be faced. This, however, is a knotty
problem in itself because it is not simply a question of statutorily authorizing or prohibiting the companies from dealing in the conveyancing
trade as well as insurance. First, in no state do the companies effect
all the conveyancing. Rather, in urban areas of some states the companies tend to do a considerable amount of the conveyancing in transactions in which they are the insurer. Thus, even in the so-called "title
insurance states" considerable variance exists between practices in the
urban, suburban and rural counties. Second, even if a solution were
built into the statute, there is some doubt whether the legislature would
have the last word, because a number of courts have ruled that the
regulation of what is or is not authorized practice of law is a judicial
question. 8
The solution to this problem is probably to be found in a clause
broad enough to authorize coveyancing if that be the accepted practice
in the area, and yet narrow enough so that a court might construe it so
as not to authorize conveyancing. The courts would thereby be able
to decide the question on the basis of statutory interpretation, without
lecturing the legislature about which organ of government is the ultimate
arbiter of this question. For example, such a clause might read: "Every
title insurer shall have the power to make insurance of every kind pertaining to or connected with titles to real estate and to make, execute and
perfect such and so many contracts, agreements, policies and other instruments as may be required therefore." 9 This clause has the added advantage that, granting prudence, the title insurers and the bar can meet
to work out an accommodation between themselves-county by county
if necessary-in order to avoid litigation.60 What it lacks in artistic
form, therefore, it more than makes up for in providing a practical vehicle for a solution of this problem.
58. See New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mort. Ass'n, 32 N.J. 430,

162 A.2d 257 (1960), and cases cited therein.
59. See Pa. Laws 1963, act 439, § 708.

60. E.g., New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mort. Ass'n, 34 N.J. 301,

169 A.2d 150 (1961).
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2: The Regulation of Title Insurance Companies.
At long last the pure insurance problem may be faced. Given
public protection as the object of insurance regulation, the underlying
problem is to decide "how" the public is to be protected. But in order
to decide on the law, one must first determine "what" public interest
is being protected. That interest is really an intangible: it is the sense
of security the public derives from paying premiums to insurance companies which in turn assume certain risks. If these risks materialize
they will not spell ruin for the insured because the insurer will pay for
the loss and, in so far as money will do it, put the insured back on his
feet again. Indeed, since the idea that "they will pay" is the source of
this sense of security, it is the public's ultimate concern to know that
they can pay. The key to regulation, therefore, is assurance to the
public that its security urge is not misdirected."'
By and large, we have seen that the typical insurance code requires
a title insurance company to be formed as a stock corporation with a
paid-in capital of $250,000 and a paid-in surplus of $125,000. In addition, as insurance against a business failure, the company has to create
a reserve which could be used to purchase new insurance for its clients.
At this point, however, most codes cease to concern themselves in any
detail with title insurance companies. Thus this question naturally
arises: how effective would these regulations be if the company insured
one title for an amount in excess of its assets and reserves and the title
failed? Certainly the claimant on this policy ought to be entitled to
levy on the assets attributable to capital and surplus and, perhaps, the
reserve as well. This could lead to two startling revelations. The assets of the company might turn out to consist primarily of its title plant,
the sale value of which might be seriously impaired in the case of a
company going out of business because of errors in its title records.
Even if the claimant did survive whole, however, the rest of the insureds
would find themselves holding absolutely worthless policies. Such a
state of affairs could not happen, say the insurers, for no title company
could write such a large policy because, in turn, no institutional investor
would accept it. As a practical matter, this rejoinder is true as far as
it goes, but it is not foolproof.
Let us suppose that a bank owns the controlling stock in a title
insurance company and that the bank is lending heavily on the security
of a large parcel of urban property. The bank is protected by title
61. For the only good article on this whole problem see Kimball, The Purpose of
Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Theory of Insurance Law, 45
MINN. L. REv. 471 (1961).
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insurance, for which the insurer received a large premium. Prudence
dictates that the policy is so large that the risk above a certain amount
ought to be reinsured with other companies. Yet if the title appears
clearly to be a good one, the bank might be tempted not to demand reinsurance, since the premiums-apparently a windfall-will then be re:tained in full by its title company. Thus the so-called institutional
investor may not always be relied on to force its title companies to
limit its risks, due to its financial interest in the insurer. In our
hypothetical, moreover, as long as the loan does not exceed the assets
of the insurer, the bank is protected. It is only the public at large who
may have also insured with the title company which is jeopardized by
such a transaction.
Even as to institutional investors present on the scene who have
no financial interest in the title insurance company, the unofficial regulatory scheme can fail to work. Posit, for example, a developer who
buys a parcel of land, subdivides it, and improves it. As a result forty
$25,000 houses are sold to forty different purchasers, with more than
a dozen lenders being involved. None of the lenders is involved, let
us say, in more than several of the mortgage loans for $20,000. Even
if astute, the lender may notice no more than that it has several houses
for security in the same area, but still the risk involved for such lender
is rather small. But (and this is not unusual) what if one local title
insurance company writes the title insurance for each sale? Should this
occur more than forty small risks are involved, because the developer
bought the land from one grantor: the total risk riding on this common
origin of the forty titles now totals one million dollars. Again the
public is in jeopardy because, unless the officials of the insurer are
remarkably conscious of their duties, nothing prevents them from carrying a single risk sizeable enough to wipe the company out should a hidden defect materialize! This is so because, with the individual loans
spread among several lenders, the several risks do not appear out of the
ordinary when viewed separately. Worse, even in those few states
which purport to regulate maximum single risks, the statutes apply only
to the several sales, not the ultimate risk inherent in the common origin
of the title pre-dating the several sales. If institutional investors take
seriously the possibility of hidden defects leading to total losses,6 2 and
if the industry itself is beginning to take them seriously,63 it follows
62. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
63. "I must note that there are increasingly large losses in our industry, but these
generally are caused by fraud, embezzlement, improper management or violation of instructions by agents." Burlingame, The Makhtg of a New Title Insurance Code, Title
News, January 1963, p. 106, 112.
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that, rather than relying on the industry itself to regulate this problem,
the state must take a hand, particularly if the validity of all the other
financial controls imposed by the state hinge on how this problem is
handled.64
In order to regulate the title insurance industry properly, therefore,
changes would have to be made in all fifty states. These changes would
entail the creation of a coherent set of regulations tailored to the rather
unique specifications of the title insurance industry. This would not be
an impossible task, however, keeping in mind the nature of the industry
to be regulated. A coherent code could be based upon the present requirement, nearly universal, that a title insurance company be a stock
corporation with a paid-in capital of $250,000. The company also ought
to have an initial paid-in surplus of $125,000. While such a surplus is
often required in the current codes, the nature of this surplus is not
always clear, particularly since some states require it to be maintained,
others do not require it to be maintained, and, interestingly enough,
some codes leave the question in doubt." Properly considered this surplus should be paid-in but need not be maintained. Rather than being
just another increment of capital, paid-in surplus plays a distinct role in
title insurance regulation. That is, the fund provides a source out of
which losses can be paid during the initial period of doing business,
providing a buffer over and above the capital pile and a substitute for
reserves not yet in existence.
As the company begins to write insurance it is not uncommon to
find that it is required by statute to segregate a part of the premiums
received into an "unearned premium reserve." Typically this portion
of premium income for any given calendar year is carried as a reserve
for twenty years, the common period of adverse possession, and then
released into income. It is not included in taxable income until the year
in which it is released. In thc2 event of a series of disastrous losses
which absorb all the other assets of the company, this reserve can be
used to purchase new insurance for all of the outstanding policyholders
of the company. This assumes; of course, that the claims for actual
losses do not eliminate the reserve as well and that, if the reserve is left
intact, another insurer can be found willing to take over the mass of
outstanding risks of the insurer that failed. The idea of such an emer64. The requirements of minimum capital, surplus and reserves are all meaningless
unless the insurer is limited to the size risk it can underwrite. Otherwise one loss could
eliminate the company and, vis-fi-vis the other policyholders, these other financial requirements could be made to appear ludicrous.
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gency reserve is sound, however, provided other measures are taken to
insure that: (1) an actual requirement to apply the reserve to satisfy
loss claims is a remote possibility and (2) should the need to reinsure
arise, the reserve will exist in fact.
Granting that the reserve is a useful backstop in the event of disaster, the practical problem of deciding how much of the incoming flow
of premium income ought to be allocated to the reserve is not resolved.
A number of states including Florida, Indiana and Ohio have settled on
ten per cent.66 New York and Pennsylvania-leaders in insurance regulation-have instituted complex mathematical formulae which boil down
to a figure nearer four per cent.6" While this latter figure matches the
year by year loss experience in the two eastern states, it certainly does
not justify itself as an unearned premium reserve figure. Indeed, it
would seem that ten per cent is a preferable figure, as the unearned
premium reserve should not be used to pay commonplace claims for
overlooked liens and the like-the normal losses suffered by title insurance. Instead, the companies ought to be required to set up a loss reserve computed by applying the average percentage of losses being suffered to the current level of premium income. While sometimes required in principle, no code contains criteria by which this loss reserve can
be computed. Thus, reason would seem to dictate that the Pennsylvania
formula be put to use by requiring its application to a loss reserve.
In ascertaining the size of the unearned premium reserve, different
considerations pertain, however. Since it would be used only when
several total failures of title or an inordinate series of smaller claims
had consumed the other available assets of the company, there seems to
be no reason to measure it by normal loss expectancy. Granting, moreover, that the reserve is no guarantee that the other insureds will be
reinsured anyway, it would seem that a higher figure of ten per cent
affords a better chance that another insurer can be induced to assume
those outstanding risks.
The task now is to reduce the likelihood that the unearned premium
reserve will ever have to be put to the test. As a minimal objective,
therefore, there ought to be devices to insure that there are sufficient
assets on hand to pay several total losses on large policies without
jeopardizing the existence of the unearned premium reserve. The max66. Id. § 6.50.
67. Ibid. The new Pennsylvania title insurance code continues the old formula:
"every title insurance company shall add to its unearned premium reserve, in respect to
each policy . . . a sum equal to one dollar ($1)

for each such policy . . . plus ten

cents (10c) for each one thousand dollars ($1,000) face amount of retained liability. . . ." Pa. Laws 1963, act 439, § 715(b).
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imum objective, of course, would be to insure that the title company
could survive several total losses without going out of business so that
the problem would never arise. The problem, therefore, is to construct
an integrated statutory system that will channel the insurers' activities
in such a way as to guarantee the optimum survival capacity.
Several steps are in order if this end is to be achieved. The first of
these is to make certain that "capital" is a meaningful concept in the
sense that the company does have hard assets."8 This can be done only
by issuing detailed regulations specifying the investments open to minimum capital, limiting them to the calibre exacted of life insurance companies for the investment of their capital. In particular the files of past
researches denominated as the "title plant" ought never be attributed
to capital. True, the title plant is a tremendously valuable asset- of the
going concern; yet it does not follow that the title plant of a defunct
company would bring much on the market, particularly if failure of the
company was due in part to errors in the search and examination of
titles. Treated in this way "minimum capital" can become a kind of
auxiliary reserve against disaster.
If a company is going to continue in business it must be able to pay
a total loss out of assets other than those attributable to minimum capital. The key, therefore, is to encourage management to build up a
surplus 9 out of which losses can be paid in the event they exceed the
loss reserve. At this point the maximum single risk limitation enters
the picture, not only as a police measure to prevent underwriting of
excessive risks, but as a mechanism to encourage the creation of even
larger surpluses. Can this be done simply by limiting single risks to
"an amount equal to net assets, less an amount equal to the sum of mini''
mum capital, unearned premium reserve, loss reserve and title plant ? 71
A few figures may help clarify this rather unusual formula. Take
a small concern with $250,000 invested in the securities required for
minimum capital, the rest of its assets consisting of buildings and other
assets worth another $100,000, together with a title plant worth
$200,000. Total assets, therefore, are $550,000, but neither minimum
capital nor title plant can be included in the calculation of risk assets,
68. Hard assets means "hard" in the sense of cash, securities and buildings, i.x.,
those things one can execute upon to satisfy a judgment in fact and which will not

depreciate in value in the event an insurance company encounters financial difficulty.
Title Plant is not a hard asset because, given a series of title failures, its book value
will turn out to be illusory.
69. Surplus for this purpose is defined as assets less liabilities, reserves, capital and
title plant.
70. This has been done in the new Pennsylvania legislation; see Pa. Laws 1963,
act 439, § 719.
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cutting the figure to $100,000. Granting an unearned premium reserve
of another $50,000 and a loss reserve of $25,000 the figure is reduced
to $25,000. Thus, unless the company has not merely maintained, but
has increased, its original paid-in surplus, it cannot write a policy of
much magnitude at all!
Granting that the company increases its surplus to $100,000 it can
write single risks at that level. From year to year no problems are to
be expected, since ordinary losses can be paid out of that small per cent
of premiums annually allocated to the loss reserve. Given the possibility of one hidden defect occurring, the company can survive the total
loss without jeopardizing its minimum capital. Given the worst imaginable-three total losses in one year-the company must collapse, but the
rest of the policyholders are not completely without recourse. The
surplus, the assets attributable to minimum capital and the title plant
estimated to be worth only half its original value are still equal to or
greater than the total of the three losses, leaving the unearned premium
reserve intact.
This approach, now in force in Pennsylvania, works well enough
in the instance of a typical title insurance company, but it collapses
completely in the instance of a huge company with nonstatutory capital
and surplus worth several millions. This is so because it can assume a
single risk of such magnitude that it cannot survive one total loss without jeopardizing the minimum capital and the unearned premium reserve.
This means, then, that-under the formula aboveP--as the size of the
company is increased the protection afforded to the policyholder is decreased in the event a hidden defect matures, leading to total losses!
This objection can be remedied readily enough by making sure that the
company does not undertake risks sizeable enough to jeopardize its
capacity to suffer three total losses without eliminating the unearned
premium reserve fund. Hence the statute should read: no single risk
shall exceed an amount equal to net assets, less an amount equal to the
sum of its minimum capital, unearned premium and loss reserves and
the value of its title plant; provided, that this amount does not exceed
one third of all net assets less reserves.
Not only must the amount of a single risk be limited, the nature
of what constitutes a single risk has to be defined. In order to avoid
the possibility of a number of separate risks suddenly merging into one
risk because each separate risk is derived from a common grant, some
kind of geographical risk control must be instituted. Thus, just as
71. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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fire insurance companies will not insure entire city blocks, so too title
companies must not insure separate risks derived from a common grantor when the statute of limitations does not afford protection against
losses attributable to hidden defects in the parent chain of title.
Further, this entire approach assumes that the insurer is searching
and examining titles in order to eliminate risks. The introduction of
casualty underwriting, therefore, would render whatever security the
public gains by this scheme totally meaningless. It follows that some
methods must be devised to insure that the companies are not in fact
engaged in casualty underwriting. By requiring the companies to keep
records of the searches and examinations of titles underlying their insurances thereon, and authorizing the insurance departments to inspect
the companies' records, the states will have taken sufficient precautions
to cure this evil should it arise."2 Again, however, regulation of this
kind is almost totally absent from the current scene.
Two more things, however, need to be regulated, both being now
inadequatedly regulated almost everywhere. These are the problem of
mergers and corporate acquisitions and the problem of rates. Both may
be omitted from this study-rates because it is worthy of a major study
in its own right, and mergers because they do not directly concern the
public as much as they do the industry itself. But the threat of federal
intervention has had one pronounced effect in that it has made the
industry itself aware of the need for regulation at the state level. The
time may be propitious, therefore, to capitalize upon the industry's fear
of federal control to initiate new legislation at the state level, if the
regulation is geared to the public need as well as private exigencies,
whether the private interest be that of the title insurer, the conveyancing
bar or the lawyers' funds.
72.

Again, this was done in Pennsylvania; see Pa. Laws 1963, act 439, § 707.

